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Authorizing Copyright Infringement and the Control
Requirement: A Look at P2P File-Sharing and
Distribution of New Technology in the U.K., Australia,
Canada, and Singapore
Jeffrey C.J. Lee†

Abstract

T

he doctrine of authorizing copyright infringement has been used to deal with the marketing of new
technology that might be employed by a user to infringe copyright, from the distribution of blank cassette
tapes and double-cassette tape recorders to photocopiers. It is being tested yet again with the distribution of peerto-peer file-sharing software that enables the online exchange of MP3 music and other copyrighted files. This
article looks at the different positions adopted in several Commonwealth jurisdictions, and examines the policy
considerations behind these positions. It looks at, in particular, the recent Australian case of Universal Music
Australia Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. While many copyright infringement issues involve a balancing of the copyright owner’s interests against the alleged infringing user’s interests, the authorization concept is
compounded by the further competing interests of promoting technology, as well as the interests of legitimate
users who deploy the technology in lawful ways. The court’s challenge is to find an acceptable equilibrium among
these interests.

Introduction

The Issue

A

T

he key issue raised by P2P file-sharing cases is the
liability of the software provider who makes freely
available to users software that is used to enable the
transfer of files, usually copyrighted music files.

s the reality and impact of peer-to-peer file-sharing
has become more apparent over the last two years,
the music industry continues to grapple with the
blessing and the evil of this technology. This technology
allows music and other files to be easily transmitted with
a click of the button through the Internet. It opens up a
new audience who hitherto may not have had access to
online materials, and thus it represents new business
potential. Yet, the ease with which copyrighted material
may be copied and transmitted illegally means that a
new audience may not always translate into immediate
corresponding economic returns.
In July 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court case of MGM
Studios v. Grokster Ltd. (‘‘ Grokster ’’) 1 strove to achieve a
fair balance between the interests of the music industry
and the need to encourage innovation, as well as the
public interest of having access to information. The Australian Federal Court case of Universal Music Australia
Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (‘‘ Sharman ’’) 2
followed soon after, dealing with almost identical technology and similar issues as those in Grokster.

In the U.K., Australia, Canada, and Singapore,
‘‘authorization’’ of copyright infringement is the doctrine
applied to secondary infringement; for instance, the
supply of a device or technology that may be used to
make illegal copies directly. The distributor does not
personally make the copies; the person to whom the
device or technology is supplied does. The users, in copying and exchanging copyrighted material, are clearly
primary infringers. Would the distributor be indirectly
liable for such copyright infringement by such users?
This article begins with a look at the technology
involved in P2P file-sharing. Grokster and Sharman are
then examined in brief. The concept of authorization
(which applies in Australia, the U.K., and Singapore) by a
person of copyright infringement by another person is
reviewed. The various jurisdictions have crafted different
scopes of this doctrine. In particular, Sharman’s approach
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to authorization and its effect on P2P transactions are
examined. Other possible bases of liability, such as incitement of infringement and joint tortfeasors, are also considered. Based on the varying interpretations of authorization in the respective jurisdictions, it is submitted that
the Grokster and Sharman scenarios do not always result
in liability for the distributor in these different jurisdictions.

The P2P Technology

T

he P2P system comprises a network through which
file exchanges occur. Key components of the system
include a file index, where files are identified by names
created by users who contribute the files for sharing. A
search facility allows the user to enter a search term or
terms for the song title (in the case of music files). On
request, the person who has contributed and stored the
song in his or her own server passes the music file to the
requesting party. There are different versions of the filesharing system.

1. Centralized System
Here, the software distributor may provide the
search engine and servers and maintain on its server an
index of the available file names of online users. File
exchange depends on the software provider maintaining
its server, as all exchanges go through the server. This was
the system used by the now defunct Napster Inc. in
A&M Records v. Napster. 3

2. Decentralized System
At the other end of the spectrum is the completely
decentralized system. Searching, file transferring, and
locating other users are performed without the help of
the software provider, its server, or the establishment of
any intermediaries.

3. Intermediate System
This was the model used in both Sharman and
Grokster (also known as the supernode or distributed
system). Here, selected users’ computers on the network
are designated as supernodes or indexing servers — the
purpose being to keep an index of available files. Actual
files, in common with the other systems, are kept in the
respective users’ computers.
Some centralized functions are the supply of the
software and a central server for keeping user registrations and logging users into the system. Decentralized
features are the file indexing and the independence of
the users (once they have located each other) in
exchanging files without going through the central
server. The supernode receives a user’s request and
searches its own index of available files kept on other
users’ computers. The supernode may communicate
with other supernodes to check for available files. The
receiving supernode then communicates these results to
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the requesting user who may download the file accordingly. In the decentralized and the intermediate systems,
users of the software products continue sharing files with
little or no interruption. This is so even if the central
server is shut down.

The Decision from U.S. Supreme
Court

G

rokster Ltd. and StreamCast Networks Inc. provided free software products for use in a supernode
P2P network model. 4
Users who copied and exchanged copyrighted
music files were clearly liable for primary copyright
infringement. As the users were numerous, the music
industry sued the suppliers of the copying enabling technology for contributory infringement to the primary
copyright violation and for vicarious liability.
Under U.S. common law, there is contributory
infringement when a material contribution is made to
an infringing activity and the alleged secondary infringer
knows of such infringing activity at the time of material
contribution. 5
For products capable of substantial non-infringing
uses, the Sony doctrine (‘‘ Sony ’’) 6 applies to bar secondary liability based on ‘‘presuming or imputing intent to
cause infringement solely from the design or distribution
of a product capable of substantial lawful uses, which the
distributor knows is in fact used for infringement’’. 7
Without effective control by the distributor over the
manner of use of the P2P software, the District Court 8
and Ninth Circuit 9 found there was no liability in contributory infringement arising from primary copyright
infringement by users exchanging copyrighted music
files. The P2P software was regarded as capable of substantial non-infringing uses (for instance, the sharing of
public domain materials and licensed music files). The
Sony defence thus absolved the defendant.
Based on Sony, there was no requisite intent to
cause infringement at the time of distribution of the
software. At the point of actual primary infringement by
users, the distributors no longer had control over the use
of the software and could not be said to contribute to
infringement by providing the ‘‘site and facilities’’ 10 for
direct infringement.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court propounded an
inducement theory of infringement that attaches liability
as follows: a person who ‘‘distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or affirmative steps taken to
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of
infringement of third parties’’. 11
All relevant circumstances are considered in evaluating whether an unlawful object exists, including
whether the alleged infringer 12 (a) showed itself to be
aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copy-
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right infringement; (b) attempted to develop filtering
tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing
activity using the software or technology in question;
and (c) makes money by selling advertising space, by
directing ads to the screens of computers using their
software.
The Supreme Court accepted the Sony doctrine as
good law — but was of the view that the doctrine did
not protect a party who had engaged in the inducing of
copyright infringement. 13
On the facts, the distributor was found to have
engaged in the following conduct:
(a) blatant advertising of its services to attract
unlawful exchanges, particularly of former Napster users;
(b) promotion of its services for use in unlawful
music file exchanges; and
(c) omission in implementation of any filtering
devices, and the proportionality of its Web site
advertising revenue to the number of users.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court unanimously disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision to uphold summary judgment for the defendants. The case was
remanded back to the District Court for disposition.
District Court Judge Stephen V. Wilson applied the
inducement doctrine and found that StreamCast 14 was
liable due to overwhelming evidence of unlawful intent,
and of its objective to promote infringement. 15

P2P File-Sharing in Australia

S

harman Networks Ltd. (‘‘Sharman’’) distributed its
Kazaa software through its Kazaa Internet P2P filesharing system on a worldwide basis. The software was
distributed for free. The system was based on the
supernode model.
The works (‘‘blue files’’) were exchanged between
peers for free, and stored in the respective users’ computer in a My Shared Folder. A supernode constantly
generated an index of all current blue files available in
users’ My Shared Folders (within which that supernode
was connected). A user submitted a request for a certain
file through the supernode. The terms of the search
request matching any part of the metadata of indexed
files would yield those files as search results. The
requesting user picked the relevant file and downloaded
such file directly from the My Shared Folder of the other
user. Sharman derived its main source of revenue from
paid advertising on its Web site.
The Kazaa network also provided users with other
works (‘‘gold files’’) made available by licence with copyright owners (through a tie-up with Alnet Inc. (‘‘Alnet’’).
The music industry commenced legal action against
Sharman, Alnet, and related companies. Also sued were
the CEOs and key technology personnel, all of whom

were alleged to exercise control over the Kazaa network
operations and its file-sharing policies.
Were Sharman, Alnet, and the other respondents
liable under the Copyright Act (Australia) 16 for authorization of infringement by users who exchanged copyrighted files without the copyright owner’s consent?
Notably, the Australian Copyright Act, section 112E,
states that a person who provides facilities for making, or
facilitating the making of, a communication is not
treated as having authorized any copyright infringement
in an audio-visual item simply because another person
uses the facilities to infringe copyright. 17
The Australian Federal Court held that section 112E
does not protect a person where, for reasons other than
mere provision of facilities, he or she may have authorized the infringement in question. The Court referred to
section 101(1A)’s non-exhaustive factors: 18 (a) the extent
(if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the
act concerned; (b) the nature of any relationship existing
between the person and the person who did the act
concerned; or (c) whether the person took any reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the doing of the act,
including compliance with any relevant industry codes
of practice.
Sharman was found liable for authorizing users’ primary copyright infringement, as the Court found ‘‘something more’’ than mere provision of facilities. In summary, the relevant circumstances included:
(a) positive conduct by Sharman, including promotion of its Web site as a file-sharing facility and
attempts to popularize unlawful file-sharing by
promoting the ‘‘Join the Revolution’’ movement;
(b) knowledge of the liable respondents of the predominant infringing use and the fact that they
did nothing about it;
(c) financial interest of the respondents in
increasing file-sharing; and
(d) absence of any attempt to install any filtering
devices. Following a detailed examination of the
difficulties of installing filtering devices,
Wilcox J. concluded that it was nevertheless possible to impose some form of filtering that
would substantially reduce infringement.
The Court also found that five other respondents
wielded real control over the Kazaa operations and its
file-sharing policies, and thus were deemed to have also
authorized the infringement.

Authorization

D

ifferent interpretations of ‘‘authorization’’ have
arisen in the U.K., Australia, Canada, and Singapore. 19 Australian courts have chosen an expansive
approach, with Sharman widening it further. However,
U.K., Canadian, and Singapore courts have adopted a
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narrow approach. These different positions will be
examined, followed by a look at how these principles
translate into the P2P context.

The Different Positions
1. U.K.

I

t has been held that an ordinary person would assume
that authorization can only come from somebody
having or purporting to have authority. 20
Authorization has also been understood to mean
‘‘sanction, approve and countenance’’. 21 This has not
been unequivocally accepted by all U.K. judges. 22
Notably, the phrase is said to be read conjunctively. 23
The limits to this concept are highlighted by Whitford J. in CBS Inc. v. Ames Records and Tapes Ltd.
(‘‘ Ames Records ’’) when he stated that ‘‘. . . an act is not
authorized by somebody who merely enables or possibly
assists or even encourages another to do that act, but
[does] not purport to have any authority which he can
grant to justify the doing of the act’’. 24
Whitford J. accepted that authorization may be
implied, and that indifference may in appropriate circumstances amount to authorization.
CBS Songs Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics
plc. (‘‘ Amstrad ’’) 25 held there is no authorization where
there is no control at the time of the primary infringement over how the consumer is going to use or misuse
the materials supplied.
In Amstrad, the material supplied was the twin-deck
tape-recording machine, while in CBS, the defendant
operated a library service, lending to customers original
discs and tapes, and also sold blank cassette tapes at a
discount. In both cases, the courts refused to find authorization as there was no real control post distribution.
Amstrad held that the supplier of the recording machine
merely conferred on the purchaser the power to copy
but did not grant or purport to grant the right to copy. 26
Amstrad expressly rejected the wider Australian
approach. 27
The U.K. judgments suggest a preference for a narrower approach as seen in the following aspects:
(a) Control
For the supply of equipment or technology used by
others to commit copyright infringement, real and effective control seems necessary for ‘‘authorization’’ to be
even considered. Only with control will the courts move
on to consider any real or purported authority.
This is borne out by express rejection of the principle enunciated in the Australian case of RCA Corp. v.
John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. 28 that:
. . . a person may be said to authorize another to commit an
infringement if the one has some form of control over the
other at the time of infringement or, if he has no such

control, is responsible for placing in the other’s hands materials which by their nature are almost inevitably to be used
for the purpose of an infringement. 29

This principle was expressly rejected by Lord Templeman in the U.K. case of Amstrad as being ‘‘stated
much too widely’’. 30
So sellers of blank tapes 31 and providers of a record
lending service 32 (who also sold blank cassette tapes)
were found not liable for authorization due to insufficient control over use of the tapes sold and records
loaned. In contrast, effective control is not a prerequisite
to finding authorization under Australian law. 33
(b) Indifference/Inaction
Generally, ‘‘authorize’’ is accepted without further
comment by the U.K. courts as ‘‘sanction, approve and
countenance’’. However, Whitford J. in Ames Records 34
threw some doubt on ‘‘countenance’’ as it ostensibly
embraced the idea of ‘‘condone’’. In particular, Whitford J. observed that ‘‘countenance’’ has the widest
meaning and held that ‘‘[i]f Parliament had intended to
give copyright owners the sole right to give countenance
to infringing acts, then no doubt they would have said so
in plain terms’’. 35
Therefore, although the U.K. judgments do not rule
out indifference or inaction as constituting ‘‘authorization’’, Ames Records suggests that it may be difficult for
any act of mere indifference to be regarded as authorization. In this case, the defendant, who operated a record
and disc lending service, also sold blank cassette tapes on
the same premises and at a discount. The defendant was
prepared to concede that he knew that home taping of
the records loaned might take place. During a certain
period, he omitted to place a warning against copyright
infringement. All these were insufficient to constitute a
quality of indifference amounting to authorization.
Such indifference would thus be only ‘‘the indifference of somebody who did not consider it his business
to interfere, who had no desire to see another person’s
copyright infringed, but whose view was that copyright
and infringement were matters in this case not for him,
but for the owners of the copyright’’. This was not legally
reprehensible. In contrast, under Australian law, it is
easier for inaction and omission to constitute authorization. 36
(c) Inevitable Infringing Use
So long as there is no control at the time of infringement, there appears to be no authorization, even if the
materials supplied ‘‘by their nature are almost inevitably
used for the purpose of an infringement’’. 37 This comment was made by Templeman J. in Amstrad in respect
of Ames Records, which dealt with the lending of original records and selling of blank cassette tapes by the
defendant.
Whitford J. in Ames Records had observed that:
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. . . you can home tape from bought records, borrowed
records, borrowed from friends or public libraries, from the
playing of records over the radio, and indeed, at no expense,
from records which can be obtained for trial periods on
introductory offers from many record clubs who advertise
in the papers, who are prepared to let you have up to three
or four records for a limited period of trial free of any charge
whatsoever. 38

Commenting on Whitford J.’s observation, Templeman J. stated:
These borrowed records together with all recording
machines and blank tapes could be said to be ‘‘materials
which by their nature are almost inevitably used for the
purpose of an infringement’’. But lenders and sellers do not
authorize infringing use. 39

The question is whether the supply of merely an element that, together with other components obtained
elsewhere, will be almost certainly used to infringe copyright renders a person liable in authorization. For a
person to supply all of the elements (for instance, the
original record, cassette tape, and the equipment to copy
the songs onto the tape) that would inevitably be used to
breach copyright is unacceptable. This was indicated by
Whitford J. in Ames Records. 40
Templeman J.’s remarks, however, seem to admit of
a defence that as long as a person does not supply all of
the components required to enable copyright breach, the
person does not authorize infringing use. This is particularly if the certain components are freely available from
other sources; for instance, many libraries are willing to
lend records and retailers are willing to deliver records
for a trial period. This would be so even if it was almost
inevitable that the element or component supplied
would be used with components obtained elsewhere by
the consumer to directly make illegal copies. If so, this
runs counter to both Australian 41 and U.S. 42 courts that
have indicated liability is most likely to attach for products that are ‘‘good for nothing else’’ but infringement,
even without post-distribution control.
(d) Specific Authorization of an Actual Breach of
Copyright
The U.K. doctrine requires proof of ‘‘some specific
authorization of an actual breach of copyright’’. 43
Alleging only authorization at large is insufficient. This
requirement seems somehow connected to the causation
factor, i.e., that the authorization in question actually did
cause the primary copyright breach. Authorization of an
actual breach of copyright is, in the words of Foster J., ‘‘by
some act directly related to that breach, and involves
some element of causation . . . ’’. 44 Interestingly, the U.S.
Sony defence echoes this — it bars secondary liability
based on ‘‘presuming or imputing intent to cause
infringement solely from the design or distribution of a
product capable of substantial lawful uses, which the
distributor knows is in fact used for infringement’’. 45 The
Sony doctrine makes it difficult to pin liability on a
distributor because at the time of distributing the
product, the distributor does not know whether the spe-

cific product will be used for a particular copyright
breach. What he does have is only a general idea that
such types of product may or will be used to infringe
copyright. This is insufficient to establish liability for
material contribution in the U.S.
From the Australian perspective, judicial comment
suggests a departure from such a narrow idea of causation. 46
(e) Knowledge
Some form of knowledge or intent is implicit in the
U.K. concept of authorization. The knowledge is either
actual or constructive.
This is similar to the U.S. position, where knowledge is a necessary component of the doctrines of contributory infringement and inducement of infringement.
The Australian courts depart from this and accept there
may be authorization without knowledge. 47

2. Australia
The seminal case of Moorhouse v. University of
New South Wales 48 (‘‘ Moorhouse ’’) held that authorization of an infringing act means the approval, countenance, sanctioning, or permitting of such act. 49 Specifically, Gibbs J. in the case noted that ‘‘authorize’’ and
‘‘permit’’ were synonymous. 50

Moorhouse involved the provision of photocopying
facilities by the University of New South Wales close to
its library. The Australian High Court held that there
was authorization by the University of wrongful reproduction by library users of copyrighted books. The University exercised real and effective control of the
machines placed on its premises but failed to post adequate warnings about, and supervise, copyright infringement.
Significantly, Jacobs J. characterized the issue as
whether an unqualified invitation was made to a potential infringer to use the photocopier as he saw fit. 51
To that extent, this would be an invitation to do
such acts comprised within the copyright of authors
whose books are on the library shelves. Such an invitation would constitute authorization.
The 2000 amendments to the Australian Copyright
Act are not seen as overriding Moorhouse except to the
extent of the safe harbour provision in section 112E. 52
Section 101(1A) provided guidelines on what might constitute authorization; namely, the alleged authorizing
party’s power to prevent the infringement, the relationship between the alleged authorizing party and the
direct infringer, and whether reasonable steps were taken
to prevent or avoid doing of the act. 53
Section 101(1A) was regarded by Wilcox J. in
Sharman as merely codifying the law on authorization
pre-2000. 54 In the light of Moorhouse and Sharman, the
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Australian approach is more expansive than U.K. law in
the following aspects.
(a) Power to Prevent and Permitting Direct
Infringement
Section 101(1A) of the Australian Copyright Act
introduces the alleged authorizing party’s power to prevent direct infringement as a highly relevant factor in
determining authorization. This new section, together
with the Sharman decision, ushers in a more liberal
order than even the Moorhouse position (which itself
was already wider than the U.K. position).

Permitting
Permitting as a form of authorization is wider than
that which can only arise from somebody having or
purporting to have authority. The latter is the narrower
English concept earlier discussed. 55
The Unqualified Invitation
The unqualified invitation to a customer to use a
tool that may be used to perpetuate direct copyright
infringement may constitute authorization. This gives an
exceedingly broad take on authorization. In Moorhouse,
Jacobs J. emphasized this aspect more than the fact that
there was continuing control by the University over the
photocopier. To this extent, Jacobs J.’s approach has been
described as ‘‘what is not specifically excluded is to be
taken to be permitted’’. 56 While Sharman affirmed that
Moorhouse was unchanged by section 101(1A), Wilcox J.
in Sharman did not expressly approve Jacobs J.’s ‘‘invitation’’ theory.
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In Sharman, significantly, the court emphasized the
ability of the respondents to prevent, or at least significantly reduce, the extent of copyright infringement. 59

No Ongoing Control Needed
Moorhouse may be explained on the ground that
there was continuing control of the photocopiers, as
Jacobs J. and, particularly, Gibbs J. 60 referred to continuing control as a significant feature for authorization
liability. However, Sharman seems to have gone some
way towards emasculating even this concept. 61
On the Sharman facts, the distributor of the P2P
software already had no effective control over how the
software was going to be used after the point of distribution, whether for infringing or non-infringing purposes.
Yet, authorization liability was found, implying that
ongoing control is no longer necessary in the Australian
context. 62 Wilcox J. in Sharman stated ‘‘[i]f Sharman had
not provided to users the facilities necessary for filesharing, there would be no Kazaa file-sharing at all’’.
This hints at a different principle based on causation and power to prevent. The mere fact of distribution
set into motion events leading up to the user employing
the software to illegally exchange music files. Without
this initial distribution, the copyright infringement
might never have occurred. Further, the words ‘‘(if any)’’
qualifies section 101(1A)(a), suggesting there may possibly be authorization without preventive power and,
hence, no control. 63

(b) Indifference/Inaction

Control vs Power to Prevent
Gibbs J. in Moorhouse approved the principle that
‘‘[a] person cannot be said to authorize an infringement
of copyright unless he has some power to prevent it’’. 57
Preventive power is conceptually broader than real
and effective control. A person may have no effective
control post-distribution over how technology provided
or materials supplied are going to be used. Yet in a wider
sense, he or she may still have the power to prevent
direct copyright infringement. Consider the scenario
where the continuing distribution of technology is
known by the distributor to have been used by earlier
users to infringe copyright, and suspected or known by
the distributor to be likely to be used by subsequent
users for infringement. Arguably, the distributor has the
power to prevent future copyright infringement and did
not do so by ceasing the supply of the technology.
In this context, Gibbs J.’s statement is exceedingly
wide, for it implies that such preventive power is necessary to constitute authorization. Section 101(1A) of the
Copyright Act affirms this principle, although it merely
states preventive power as one of the many factors to be
considered. 58

Countenance, or permitting direct infringement,
implies lack of positive action or active participation or
contribution towards such infringement.
Inactivity or indifference, exhibited by acts of commission or omission, may reach a degree from which an
authorization or permission may be inferred. This has
been again approved in Sharman. 64 Sections 101(1A)(a)
and (c) of the Australian Copyright Act, in referring to a
person’s power to prevent infringement as a relevant
factor, show a greater willingness to find authorization
for failure to do something.
Significantly, Sharman imposed a duty on the
software distributor to incorporate filtering devices in
future products, as well as attempting to persuade
existing users of software already downloaded to voluntarily upgrade to a new version of the software with such
filtering features. This was despite evidence showing that
one type of filtering would involve problems of filtering
out files that could be legally exchanged. It was enough
that such filtering would substantially reduce illegal filesharing. In the Sharman context, this duty is an ongoing
obligation imposed in a fact scenario where no real control existed after distribution. 65
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(c) Inevitable Infringing Use
The Australian approach makes it difficult to escape
authorization liability for distribution of a product that
will be inevitably used for infringing purposes. 66
(d) Specificity of Authorization
A commonly held view is that general exhortations
to infringe are not sufficient, unless specific acts of
infringement can be established. 67 However, the degree
of specificity is relative. It appears that Australian courts
are less strict on the extent of specificity of the infringing
acts alleged to have been authorized. In Moorhouse,
Gibbs J. stated that:
Although in some of the authorities it is said that the
person who authorizes an infringement must have knowledge or reason to suspect that the particular act of infringement is likely to be done, it is clearly sufficient if there is
knowledge or reason to suspect that any one of a number of
particular acts is likely to be done, as for example, where the
proprietor of a shop installs a gramophone and supplies a
number of records any one of which may be played on it:
Winstone v. Wurlitzer Automatic Phonograph Co. of Australia Pty Ltd., supra. 68

The Sharman facts and decision also seem to require
authorization to be of a low degree of specificity. In that
case, Wilcox J. found that the software distributor knew
of the predominant infringing use of the software by
users. 69 Yet, as the software could be used legally to
exchange non-infringing materials, the distributor could
not be said to know with any degree of particularity
whether, at the point of distribution, the software was
going to be wrongfully or rightfully used, and if wrongfully used, in respect of a particular MP3 file. Extending
the duty to implement anti-infringement features to
future versions of the software further dilutes any specificity of the authorization.
(e) Knowledge
Traditionally, the mental element in authorization
requires either actual or constructive knowledge. Authorization by a person could not be inferred from mere
inactivity if he or she neither knew nor had reason to
suspect the act might be carried out. This, at least, was
the position adopted by Gibbs J. in Moorhouse. 70
In the same case, Jacobs J., in keeping with his liberal interpretation, held that, where the making available
of a technology constitutes an unqualified invitation to
carry out infringing acts, then knowledge need not be
proven. 71 (However, for a qualified invitation that did
not extend to doing of acts comprised in copyright,
knowledge is relevant if it is known that the qualification
to the invitation was being ignored.) 72 While not
directly affirming Jacobs J.’s ‘‘invitation’’ theory, 73
Wilcox J. in Sharman has affirmed that ‘‘there may be
authorization without knowledge’’. 74
Sharman involved a case of actual knowledge, i.e.,
the distributor of the P2P software was found to actually
know of user infringement in illegally exchanging music

files. Arguably, the apparent dispensation by Jacobs J.
with the knowledge requirement may be with regard to
dispensing with the proof of knowledge as opposed to
the knowledge requirement itself. In other words, constructive knowledge would at least be presumed in certain cases.
However, Jacobs J.’s and Wilcox J.’s failure to clearly
say this implies there may be instances where the courts
will not trouble themselves with the knowledge requirement, constructive or otherwise.

3. Canada
In CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper
Canada (‘‘ CCH v. LSUC ’’), 75 the Supreme Court of
Canada has expressly rejected Moorhouse as being
inconsistent with the Canadian concept of authorization.
McLachlin C.J. opined:
In my view, the Moorhouse approach to authorization
shifts the balance in copyright too far in favour of the
owner’s rights and unnecessarily interferes with the proper
use of copyrighted works for the good of society as a
whole. 76

The facts in CCH v. LSUC are strikingly similar to Moorhouse. The Law Society of Upper Canada maintained
within its legal library free-standing photocopiers that
were used by patrons to photocopy its law materials. The
publishers of the legal materials claimed the Law Society
authorized allegedly unlawful copying.
In this case, McLachlin C.J. accepted that
‘‘authorize’’ means ‘‘sanction, approve and countenance’’. 77 Of ‘‘countenance’’, the Chief Justice accepted
that it must be understood in its strongest dictionary
meaning, ‘‘namely, give approval to, sanction, permit,
favour, encourage’’. 78 This is inferred from acts that are
‘‘less than direct and positive, including a sufficient
degree of indifference’’. 79
However, she found, as one of the grounds of her
decision, that the Law Society lacked sufficient control
over the users who photocopied its materials.
McLachlin C.J. highlighted the absence of any
master–servant or employer–employee relationship that
would result in the Law Society having control over end
users.
This decision is important, because while the Australian courts are inclined towards the liberal side, the
Canadian Supreme Court has swung decidedly to the
other side in giving a new meaning to control.
It should be noted that the self-service photocopiers
were within the library itself, and to that extent were
capable of some monitoring by the Law Society. The
society could and did set the conditions of use; the times
of and charges for use were set by the society. Ordinarily,
this would be seen as control over the photocopiers, as in
the Moorhouse holding. Control should be distinguished from supervision. The society’s inability or
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failure to monitor each and every user and what he or
she photocopies is rightly a supervisory issue.

case, there was no proof of such actual notice. Binnie J.
observed:

In other words, there can be control together with
imperfect or inadequate supervision. Existence of control
should not of itself mean liability, provided there is adequate supervision.

The knowledge that someone might be using neutral
technology to violate copyright . . . is not necessarily sufficient to constitute authorization, which requires a demonstration that the defendant did ‘‘[g]ive approval to, sanction,
permit, favour, encourage’’ . . . the infringing conduct. 90

McLachlin C.J. seems, however, to have equated
control with supervision when concluding that the Law
Society was regarded as not having control ‘‘over which
works were being copied, the users’ purposes for copying
nor over the photocopiers themselves’’. 80

On the Grokster and Sharman facts, the Canadian
position is likely to yield a no-authorization finding, no
matter how questionable the conduct (whether positive
conduct or indifference). This is because in the decentralized or supernode networks there would be no control over the software, the music files being copied, nor
the purpose for which the copying was done. Even for
the centralized network, the Canadian position may
arguably be applied to find there was no control, and,
hence, no authorization.

Taken to its logical conclusion, this reasoning
means that as it is not possible to track each and every
work being copied, or each and every user’s purpose in
copying, there is thus no control exercised by the Law
Society. This is an extreme position, because it is in rare
cases where there is control and perfect supervision over
each and every usage of the technology in question.

CCH v. LSUC has far-reaching implications when
considered in its context. The Law Society:
(a) placed or caused to be placed free-standing
photocopiers within its library premises; 81
(b) had continuing control over the photocopiers in
that it could implement stricter supervision,
determine and change the conditions and times
of use, and reduce the number of copiers (or
even discontinue any such facility); 82
(c) should arguably have known or suspected that a
number of users were photocopying in breach
of the copyright laws; 83 and
(d) did not supervise at all. 84
The subsequent case of SOCAN v. CAIP (Supreme
Court of Canada) 85 concerned the Internet service provider’s (‘‘ISP’’) liability for users’ exchange of music files
online. Binnie J. held that section 2.4(1)(b) of the Canadian Copyright Act 86 applied to protect the ISP, which
acted as a mere conduit of subject-matter and did not
communicate such subject-matter in breach of copyright. 87
On the additional issue of whether the ISP authorized such exchange of files, Binnie J. affirmed CCH v.
LSUC and commented:
The operation of the Internet is obviously a good deal
more complicated than the operation of a photocopier, but
it is true here, as it was in the CCH case, that when massive
amounts of non-copyrighted materials are accessible to the
end user, it is not possible to impute to the Internet Service
Provider, based solely on the provision of Internet facilities,
an authority to download copyrighted material as opposed
to non-copyrighted material. 88

But what seemed critical to the issue was whether there
was actual knowledge of the ISP of any specific infringement. This could be through a notice of infringing content; failure by the ISP to respond to such notice by
removing such content ‘‘may in some circumstances’’ 89
lead to a finding of authorization. On the facts of the

While the Supreme Court in CCH v. LSUC wanted
to strike an equilibrium between the copyright owners’
and users’ rights, it could have avoided the artificiality of
its finding of lack of control and achieved the same noauthorization holding by finding that (a) the posting of a
copyright warning notice was sufficient preventive
action; or (b) there was no actual knowledge of specific
infringement (as highlighted in SOCAN v. CAIP). Alternatively, it could have confined its no-authorization
finding to the ground that no evidence was tendered to
show that the photocopiers were used in an infringing
manner. 91
This resistance to ever-expanding copyright owners’
rights is echoed in BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe (Federal Court). 92 Here, the issue was whether ISPs could be
forced to disclose identities of their subscribers who
were swapping music files over the Internet.
In considering authorization, Justice von Finckenstein noted that the mere fact of placing a copy on a
shared directory in a computer where that copy could be
accessed via a P2P service does not amount to distribution. 93 To constitute distribution, there had to be a positive act by the owner of the shared directory, such as the
sending of the copies, or advertising that they are available for copying. 94
These comments have subsequently been overruled
in the Federal Court of Appeal as ‘‘it is premature to
reach any conclusion as to the applicability of the CCH
case’’. 95 This was because not all the evidence had been
presented in this application for the disclosure order. To
this extent, the comments (or ‘‘hard conclusions’’) 96 are
no longer applicable. The Federal Court of Appeal
reserved for future consideration the question of
whether users’ acts of copying the songs onto a shared
directory constituted authorization on the basis of invitation, and permission to other persons with Internet
access to have the musical works communicated to and
be copied by them. 97 To what extent subsequent cases
will expand or restrict the concept of authorization
remains to be seen.
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4. Singapore
The Singapore position on authorization is much
less clear. The landmark case Ong Seow Pheng & Others
v. Lotus Development Corp 98 (‘‘ Ong Seow Pheng (Court
of Appeal)’’) involved the supply by the defendant of
infringing copies of a software manual and a single
infringing copy of the software itself. The recipient was
known to the defendant to be in the business of selling
illegal software.
Despite proximity and directness of the supply by
the supplier and the copyright infringement by the
receiving party, the Singapore Court of Appeal held there
was no authorization. This may be contrasted with the
supply of equipment that is capable of being used for
legal and illegal reproductions — a less direct contribution to copyright infringement by the user.
Yet the court, while taking note of the difference in
the two scenarios, was overwhelmingly influenced by
continuing control (or lack thereof) as the determinative
factor.
Relying on CBS and Amstrad (both English cases),
and Moorhouse (Australia), the court distinguished the
English cases from the Australian case on the issue of
control. While ostensibly approving these cases, the court
failed to specifically comment and indicate its views on
the different scopes of ‘‘authorization’’ in these jurisdictions.
In particular, Ong Seow Pheng (Court of Appeal)
approved U.K.’s Amstrad. L.P. Thean J.A. in the Court of
Appeal expressly stated:
We accept that Ong supplied Lur with a copy of the
programme together with the manuals. In doing so, he
might well have suggested to Lur that copies of the
programmes could be made. However, that is was [sic] a far
cry from saying that the appellants thereby authorized Lur
to make copies of the programme. He might have facilitated, and even incited, Lur’s infringements, but as was held
in CBS Songs [v] Amstrad, that is not the same thing as
authorization. As the learned judge held, and we agree with
her, once the appellants had sold and delivered the
infringing copies of the manuals or programmes to Lur,
these copies were out of their hands and they had no control over what Lur would do with reference to them.
Clearly, the Moorhouse case has no application here. 99

The scope of authorization in Singapore thus remains
unclear. In disapplying Moorhouse on the ground of
control, it seems that this factor will be decisive in most
cases. Arguably, Singapore’s position is narrower than the
English position.

Ames Records and Amstrad deal with the supply of
original materials (i.e., records) or equipment (i.e., hispeed recorders). Similarly, for the supply of blank cassette tapes in A & M Records Inc. v. Audio Magnetics Inc.
(U.K.) Ltd. (‘‘ A&M Records ’’). 100 These materials could
have been used for good or evil. Without ongoing control post-distribution, there is little direct, causative effect
on the ultimate copyright infringement by the user. This
observation springs from Foster J.’s comment in A&M

Records that authorization of a breach must be ‘‘by some
act directly related to that breach, and involves some
element of causation. . . . ’’. 101
But this is surely very different from the supply of
infringing copies themselves ‘‘on a wholesale basis to
persons whom [the supplier] knew were in the business
of retailing pirated computer packages to the public’’. 102
One defendant had in fact specifically told the recipient
‘‘to make as many copies of the programme as he needed
in order to make complete packages for sale to the
public’’. 103 The inevitability 104 of the use by the recipient
of these infringing copies itself further distinguishes the
Singapore case from the English cases, and led Judith
Prakash J. to hold that there was authorization. This was
overruled by the Court of Appeal.
The Singapore Court of Appeal’s application of the
‘‘control’’ criterion (as discerned from English cases with
very different facts) to the facts of Ong Seow Pheng
(Court of Appeal) may be seen as overemphasizing the
importance of control, almost to the exclusion of other
factors. That other factors should not always be totally
disregarded is seen in the phrase ‘‘sanction, approve and
countenance’’, 105 which was cited by the Singapore court
with approval. For cases other than provision of equipment or technology used for infringing purposes, the
degree of indifference and proximity between the provision and illegal reproduction may be so immediate and
have such an impact that lack of continuing control
should no longer be determinative. 106

Two Scenarios

I

n the P2P file-sharing context, two scenarios are contrasted: where there is ongoing control by the distributor, i.e., continuing control post-distribution; and where
there is control only at the point of distribution. The
comments apply equally to any new technology
launched from time to time that is capable of both
proper and wrongful uses by the end user.
There is thus an interplay of positive wrongful conduct, quality of preventive action, and lack of action. The
various jurisdictions place different emphasis on each
factor in each of the scenarios.

1. Ongoing Control
The existence of ongoing control, even after the
time of distribution, appears to necessarily imply preventive power. The question arises: what kind of preventive
action might be needed to escape liability, if any?
Such preventive action should be contrasted with
positive wrongful conduct. The latter might include provocative advertisements that show an intent to influence
in some way a user to apply the technology for
infringing purposes, providing assistance to users who
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have trouble using the technology, and providing both
technology and infringing materials together to users.

ness of filtering devices would either increase or reduce
the burden on the innovator and distributor.

It may not be difficult to find authorization where
there is ongoing control plus such positive wrongful conduct. However, the final conclusion depends on many
other factors that may negate or diminish the effect of
such positive conduct.

It is most improbable that courts will ever require
measures to totally prevent primary infringement. However, copyright seeks a balance between encouraging the
creativity and innovation of copyright owners and fair
use of copyrighted materials and, arguably, the innovation of copying-enabling technology and the right of use.
This equation is compounded by the right of users to
lawful usage of the technology and the attendant
freedom of access to information. In other words, what is
half-hearted or effective remains a vexed issue. As discussed below, Sharman appears to require that filtering
measures be able to ‘‘substantially reduce’’ 114 primary
infringement. But there was no ongoing control in
Sharman — this suggests that, in ongoing control cases,
at least the same or higher level of preventive measures
should be implemented in Australia. (The problems
relating to the phrase itself are further dealt with
below.) 115

These factors are broadly classified as preventive
action such as warnings, installing of anti-infringement
devices, and general supervision.
For instance, posting warnings against deploying the
technology for infringing purposes would go some way
towards reducing the possibility of a finding of authorization. The wording and conspicuousness of the
warning play an important role. In Moorhouse
(involving photocopiers), a warning was placed in a
library guide issued to students. This was found to be
inaccurate in stating that photocopying could be done
for research or private study, as it did not qualify that this
was subject to fair dealing. Another warning was placed
on the photocopying machines but was not relevant to
users.
Australian courts take a robust practical approach
and look at the actual effect of the warning on users. 107
For the warning to indicate that a copy of the applicable
copyright act was available for reading is not enough, as
it is likely to be obscure to the layperson. 108

Sharman took a dim view of the warning posted by
the P2P distributor, as the warning did not clearly state
that music files were likely to be subject to copyright and
that sharing such files online would violate copyright. 109
Again, the court measured the efficacy of the warning by
looking at its actual effect and noted that the advertising
and other blatant conduct negated the warning. 110
Another preventive measure is the installation of
filtering devices, which may be given great importance,
depending on the jurisdiction. Obviously, the sufficiency
and extent of such measures to counteract any blatant
wrongful conduct have significant impact on new technology design.
Supervision (or lack thereof) is a preventive step that
flows from retention of control by the distributor over
the way users apply the technology. In Moorhouse, it was
noted that the trial judge found that the photocopying
machines ‘‘were unsupervised in any practical and useful
sense, with the knowledge of the University librarian’’. 111
In other words, the supervision was not of an effective
kind. 112
For P2P file-sharing and other new technology in
the Australian context, where there is ongoing control
over the manner of use of the technology, great emphasis
will be placed on preventive action and omission to
supervise or monitor infringement. Moorhouse would
require effective supervision, not just any half-hearted
attempt. 113 The standard set by courts for the effective-

This is due to the generous width given to the
‘‘authorization’’ concept. Arguably, authorization is more
easily found in Australia, though there is no blatant misconduct. Not doing anything or failing to do enough
towards preventing primary infringement may be sufficient to found liability. This was so in Moorhouse, where
liability was based on a series of ineffectual preventive
measures (inadequate warnings and ineffective supervision of the photocopiers by the university library).
In the U.K., it is unclear how the courts will treat the
act of distributing new technology that is used for
infringing purposes but is capable of being used for noninfringing purposes as well. Given the narrower scope of
‘‘authorization’’, it may be harder to impose authorization liability on a distributor of new technology where
such person is merely indifferent. The English court in
CBS has disagreed that ‘‘authorization’’ should encompass ‘‘countenance’’ or ‘‘condone’’ as this would be too
wide a meaning. 116 Notably, CBS involved no continuing control after distribution — this may account for
the narrower approach. In the U.K., it may indeed also
be easier to neutralize the effect of wrongful conduct
with a less exacting standard of preventive action than
that required under Australian law.
In Singapore, the position remains unclear, not least
because the court in Ong Seow Pheng (Court of Appeal)
approved both the U.K. and Australian cases that advocated very different approaches.

2. Control Only at the Point of Sale or
Distribution
Distribution of video recorders, tape recorders, and
Grokster-type P2P file-sharing software has the common
feature that, after the point of distribution, the distrib-
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utor no longer has control over the product being distributed. Three issues arise here; namely,
(i) Is control the sine qua non of authorization?
(ii) Does lack of ongoing control mean there is
no power to prevent?
(iii) What can amount to authorization if there is
no control?
(i) Is Control the Sine Qua Non of Authorization?
In Australia, the answer is no. In the U.K. and
Canada, control seems necessary for finding authorization liability. This is gleaned from U.K. and Canadian
cases dealing with the distribution of copying-enabling
or reproduction technology.
There seems to be no justification to extend the
U.K. position to other situations other than the supply of
such technology. For instance, the supply of actual
infringing materials themselves may be differentiated
from distribution of copying-enabling technology.
Singapore appears to have taken the narrowest position to date and applied the control test as determinative, even though in Ong Seow Pheng (Court of Appeal)
the impact of supplying infringing materials could be
said to be directly linked to the actual sale of these
infringing materials (i.e., the software manuals) and further reproduction of the materials for sale (i.e., the
software program itself). A fortiori for the supply of copying-enabling technology that may be used for both legal
and illegal purposes.
(ii) Does Lack of Ongoing Control Mean There Is
No Power To Prevent?
It may appear easy to justify not doing enough to
prevent infringement because of having no ongoing control. This certainly seems the case in Singapore and the
U.K.
In other words, it is less easy to blame the technologist on account of failure to implement anti-filtering features in his or her technology, much less track the
manner of use by the users.
The ‘‘control’’ criterion can be very misleading,
because it seems to unduly hinge the weighty issue of
‘‘authorization’’ on a single factor. It is true that control is
very important in many cases, but, with the advent of
new technology in P2P file-sharing, it is submitted that
‘‘control’’ misdirects the enquiry from the start by
ignoring or failing to give due weight to other relevant
conduct. Authorization can come from somebody who
purports to have authority even though he has no real
control — purporting depends to a large extent on the
appearance of things to third parties, and this must
derive from wrongful conduct or lack of appropriate
action as well as the reality of whether there is actual
control. In other words, control should only be one of
the factors, not necessarily the determinative one.
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This is the way the Australian courts have gone by
widening the authorization concept so as not to solely
depend on actual continuing control, but also to consider the power to prevent, and a host of other conductrelated 117 factors. Thus, from the Australian viewpoint,
lack of direct control is not an obstacle to taking steps to
prevent infringement.
(iii) What Can Amount to Authorization if There
Is No Control?
While the courts of some jurisdictions grapple with
the significance of control, the Australian position gets
around this issue in a few ways.
One way simply treats control as no longer that
important. 118 The other is to adopt an extremely broad
view of control. The rationale is that, even if the distributor did not control the manner of continuing usage by
the user, the distributor, in continuing to release more of
such products for new users, is by the act of distribution
itself contributing to such future infringement. To this
extent, the control is more expansive.
The above is useless in fixing liability if the supplier
had to have actual knowledge of specific infringement.
In view of the lack of real ongoing control, as on the
Sharman and Grokster facts, it is difficult to prove that
such a distributor possessed such knowledge.
To overcome this, the Australian courts have stated
that it is not necessary to have knowledge of a particular
infringing act. It is sufficient for there to be knowledge or
reason to suspect that any one of a number of particular
infringing acts is likely to be done.
Yet another liberalization was in the form of a wide
preventive duty and even allowing authorization to
include mere countenance. Accordingly, indifference
and omission assume increased significance in the Australian context. This presents perhaps the greatest challenge, for it raises the knotty issue of how much is
enough. While for continuing control, it is easier to justify imposing a duty to actively take steps towards
preventing infringement, it is much less clear for a case
of no ongoing control.
Wilcox J. in Sharman expressed his concern that he
should not make an order ‘‘which the respondents are
not able to obey, except at the unacceptable cost of
preventing the sharing even of files which do not
infringe the applicants’ copyright’’. 119 Wilcox J. observed
that the keyword filtering and/or gold file flood filtering
would ‘‘substantially reduce’’ 120 the frequency of copyright file-sharing. While keyword filtering would imperfectly fail to detect copyrighted materials bearing a file
name carrying metadata deliberately altered to circumvent such detection (i.e., false negatives) and wrongly
filter out non-copyrighted files (i.e., false positives),
Wilcox J. felt that in the Sharman context, false positives
would not be a frequent occurrence, as the sharing was
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predominantly of copyrighted popular music. Weighing
the negative consequences to legitimate users against the
benefit to copyright owners, the judge felt that the
imperfect filter ‘‘would go far to protect copyright
owners’’. 121

Other Causes of Action

The above suggests that if proposed measures do
not ‘‘substantially reduce’’ the infringement or involve an
unacceptable sacrifice of wrongly filtering out too many
non-copyright files, then it would not be too necessary to
implement these measures. What does or does not substantially reduce and how much is too many are difficult
questions.

P

Interestingly, in this whole equation, Wilcox J. did
not emphasize or factor in the result of implementing
devices that may be very effective but which unduly
hinder the design and marketability of the product, or
simply involve too high a supervisory/design cost to the
technologist. 122
Another practical difficulty lies in the Court holding
that, to avoid inference of authorization, another measure would be to put ‘‘maximum pressure’’ 123 on existing
users of the software to upgrade their software (without
any filtering technology) to one that contains nonoptional filtering features. What would be sufficient to
constitute ‘‘maximum pressure’’ is too fraught with great
uncertainty.
The Australian Federal Court stipulated in one of its
orders (referred to as ‘‘order 4’’) that an order be made
‘‘restraining the six infringing respondents from further
infringing the applicants’ copyright in any sound recordings by authorizing the doing in Australia by Kazaa users
of any infringing acts, in relation to any sound recording,
the copyright of which is held by any of the applicants,
without the licence of the relevant copyright owner’’. 124
The court stated that continuation of the system
with the filtering devices and other measures described
above would not be deemed to contravene order 4.
Order 4 has been challenged in an appeal for its
ambiguity. 125 In response to contempt proceedings for
failure to comply with order 4, Sharman characterized
the order as ‘‘ambiguous’’ and ‘‘not an order non-compliance with which is capable of founding a contempt proceeding’’. 126
The continuing saga of Sharman illustrates the great
difficulty in setting not just proper but workable boundaries of copyright protection that do not encroach on the
user’s freedom of access to non-copyrighted materials.
Crafting an effectively enforceable order presents
another challenge. Compounding this is the question of
the extent, if any, to which the needs and interests of the
technologist should be taken into account. 127

1. Joint Tortfeasor
ersons are joint tortfeasors when their respective
shares in the commission of the tort are done in
furtherance of a common design. 128
In Amstrad (sale of twin-deck tape-recording
machines), Templeman J. held that there was no joint
tortfeasorship between the distributor of hi-speed tape
recorders and the primary infringers. He explained:
. . . Amstrad sells models which include facilities for
receiving and recording broadcasts, disc records and taped
records. All these facilities are lawful although the recording
device is capable of being used for unlawful purposes. Once
a model is sold, Amstrad has no control over or interest in
its use. In these circumstances the allegation that Amstrad is
a joint infringer is untenable. . . . In the present case there is
no common design between Amstrad and anybody else to
infringe copyright. 129

This test considers whether the machine was capable of
being used for lawful or unlawful purposes. If the
machine was capable of being used for both such purposes, it would be harder to find a common design
between distributor and customers, as at least some users
might be using it for legal purposes. The test also considers whether the distributor had control over the
product post-distribution.
In the P2P file-sharing context, the phrase ‘‘capable
of being used for unlawful purposes’’ requires clarification.
A similar phrase ‘‘capable of substantial noninfringing use’’ in the U.S. Sony doctrine continues to
generate considerable debate as to its meaning. The
narrow approach emphasizes the ‘‘substantial’’ element
over the ‘‘capable’’ element and attempts to balance current and potential non-infringing uses against infringing
uses. 130 The broad interpretation merely asks whether a
technology is merely capable of non-infringing uses in
commerce without comparing the proportion of noninfringing uses to infringing uses. 131
The U.S. uncertainties, when translated into the
U.K. and Singapore context, raise the following concerns.
If the technology is, in reality, used for substantially
illegal purposes, is it easier to infer a common design?
How should degree and extent of legal use versus
unlawful use be considered? No clear answers exist.
Another issue deals with lack of control. If there is
no control, can there still be joint tortfeasorship?
In Lotus Development Corporation v. Ong Seow
Pheng (Singapore High Court), 132 Judith Prakash J. held
that the defendant supplied infringing copies of a
manual plus a single copy of software to a customer
known to the first defendant to be used for further illegal
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reproduction. 133 The evidence showed that ‘‘the first
defendant himself specifically told Mr. Lur to make as
many copies of the programme as he needed in order to
make complete packages for sale to the public’’. 134 The
judge characterized the pirated master programme diskettes supplied by the first defendant as ‘‘only capable of
one illegal purpose in the hands of the retail pirates’’. 135
Prakash J. held that there was a common design between
the first defendant and his customers. This was despite
the first defendant having no control over the customers
(as characterized by the Court of Appeal) and not being
directly in business with such customers. 136 The first
defendant, however, had a financial interest in how successful their customers were in pirating and selling the
infringing copies directly to end users. 137
However, the Court of Appeal 138 overruled and
took an extremely narrow view of ‘‘common design’’.
Citing with approval Lord Templeman in Amstrad, the
Court of Appeal basically required that the joint
tortfeasors must be liable for the same infringing act so
each commits the same tort. Here, the Court of Appeal
characterized the first defendant’s primary business as
selling pirated computer manuals and his customer’s
business as selling pirated computer programs packaged
with pirated instruction manuals. Therefore, they were
different businesses and had no common design. 139
Although the Court of Appeal noted that the sale of a
device used to enable copyright infringement (as in
Amstrad) is very different from the supply of the
infringing materials themselves (as in Ong Seow Pheng
(Court of Appeal)), the Court ultimately did not hold
there was sufficient similarity in the respective business
for there to be a common design.

2. Incitement of Infringement
This tort arises from a direct infringement of copyright and relates to the idea of incitement or procurement of the direct infringement.
A divergence of opinion has emerged as to whether
this is a distinct tort from the tort of direct copyright
infringement 140 or whether this is joint tortfeasor liability
based on the notion that the party inciting shares a
common design or acts in concert with the direct
infringing party. 141
Either way, this cause of action falters on the
Sharman facts due to the following problems:
(a) If a common design is required, it would be
difficult to show a common design between the
distributor of the software or similar new technology and the user because they would not be
in the same business, and the technology was
capable of being used for both lawful or
unlawful copying. To this extent, there was no
control over the way of use of the technology by
the user. In Amstrad, 142 it was held that the
defendant ‘‘does not procure infringement by
offering for sale a machine which may be used
for lawful or unlawful copying and it does not
procure infringement by advertising the attrac-

tions of its machine to any purchaser who may
decide to purchase unlawfully. [The defendant]
is not concerned to procure and cannot procure
unlawful copying. The purchaser will not make
unlawful copies because he has been induced or
incited or persuaded to do so by [the defendant].
The purchaser will make unlawful copies for his
own use because he chooses to do so’’. 143
Applying this to the Sharman facts, the absence
of real control over the use of the P2P filesharing software means that there is unlikely to
be any common design for the purpose of
proving incitement of infringement.
(b) An element in this action requires incitement of
specific persons. 144 Put another way, the
‘‘inducement, incitement or persuasion to
infringe must be by a defendant to an individual infringer and must identifiably procure a
particular infringement’’. 145 This is difficult to
show, especially with loss of control after distribution.
This tort bears superficial resemblance to the U.S.
doctrine of inducement of infringement as expounded
in Grokster. Under the U.S. theory, a person who ‘‘distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for
the resulting acts of infringement of third parties’’. 146
Yet the U.S. doctrine is much wider, as there is no
express ‘‘common design’’ requirement. Also, the defendant does not need to induce specific acts of infringement for liability to be found. 147 A relevant factor cited is
whether the alleged infringer showed itself to be aiming
to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright
infringement. 148 On the Grokster facts, Grokster was
found to have deliberately targeted the former users of
the Napster P2P file-sharing system that had been shut
down. This is only a factor to be considered and is not
decisive; in any case, it is very far from the specificity
required under the joint tortfeasor cause of action.

Conclusion: U.K. Approach Too
Narrow and Australian Approach
Too Wide?

B

ased on current U.K. and Singapore jurisprudence, a
few results follow:
(a) There is likely to be no authorization liability on
the Grokster and Sharman facts, simply because
there is no continuing control by the distributor.
(b) There is no joint tortfeasor or incitement of
infringement liability because there is no
common design and/or there is no incitement
of specific persons.
While this favours the technologists and legitimate
users of the technology and encourages innovation, the
scales are arguably unfairly tipped against copyright
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owners. This is particularly so when the above obstacles
to liability are not premised on lack of objectionable
conduct but on lack of control as being a prerequisite
(even though it may not directly relate to, or have an
impact on, purporting to authorize or incite infringement). To avoid prejudicing the technologist and legitimate user, a higher threshold of conduct may be set, i.e.,
clearly blatant positive acts that contribute in a real way
to infringement.
This is obviously a delicate balancing exercise. In
Canada, recent cases show a resurgence of users’ rights so
as to prevent a shift ‘‘too far in favour of the owners’
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rights’’. 149 In contrast, Australia illustrates the dangers of
the slippery slope in lowering the threshold conduct. 150
Greater uncertainty and burden are placed on the technologist. It is argued that past inventions (such as the
video recorder and tape recorders), while enabling an
initial surge in infringements, have eventually enlarged
the lawful market for copyrighted works by creating
accessibility and awareness. 151 The resulting chill on
technology created by the Australian position may prove
in the long run to be detrimental to the copyright owner
as well.
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